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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 








STATEMENT OF FACTS 
In support of the information filed on the 14th day 
of July, 1955, charging Eugene Johnson and Charles 
Brooks with second-degree burglary (R. 5), the State 
presented the following testimony at the trial held the 
23rd and 24th days of September, 1955, the Honorable 
Charles G. Cowley presiding. 
The first witness called on behalf of the State was 
Lew S. Birch. He testified that during the early morning 
hours of July 3, 1955, while acting in the capacity of a 
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police officer of Ogden City, he noticed a man walking 
away from the front door of a closed shop (R. 9). As 
the police officers approached, they called to him to 
stop, which he did. Officer Birch alighted from the car, 
made a quick search of the man, who is appellant herein, 
and then started to examine the building by which the 
appellant was first sighted. As the officer approached 
the front of the building he saw another man inside the 
shop (R. 10). Officer Birch found the front door locked 
and then checked the building to see how the man inside 
had gained entry. He discovered that a window in the 
rear of the store had been broken (R. 11). 
Upon the arrival of the officers that had been sum-
moned to help, it was discovered that the appellant who 
had been handcuffed and placed in the patrol car driven 
by Officers Birch and Muller, had tried to escape (R. 12). 
A quick search of the area was made and appellant was 
found lying face down by a service station a short dis-
tance from the patrol car with his forehead badly cut 
( R 12). The officers phoned the owner of the store and 
when the owner's son arrived, they entered the store and 
arrested Charles Brooks (R. 12). 
Officer Birch testified that while appellant and 
Brooks were being transported to the police station, the 
appellant, in a conversation with him, did not deny 
being implicated in the burglary and in fact, admitted 
that he wns when he stated that, "there was too many 
other 1wople involved·' for him to give the policemen 
any information (R. 42-43). Officer Birch further testi-
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fied that after the appellant and his companion had been 
taken to the police station he returned to the store and 
examined the area around it. At the rear of the building 
he located some tools and also a ladder which was par-
tially covered with cardboard (R. 45). The window 
through which Brooks entered the shop was 18 feet 
above the ground (R. 47). He also testified that appel-
lant and his companion, though they had alcohol on their 
breath, did not appear to be drunk and both men were 
able to talk and walk in a reasonably sober manner 
(R. 29-40). 
The next witness called by the State was David Mul-
ler. Mr. Muller testified to the following: That he was, 
during the early morning hours of July 3, 1955, em-
ployed by Ogden City as a police officer; that he was 
with Officer Birch on their regular rounds at that time 
(R. 48). Mr. Muller's testimony corroborates the testi-
mony of Officer Birch. It was Officer Muller who discov-
ered that the appellant had apparently tried to escape 
from the police car (R 50) and it was he who found the 
appellant lying face down by a service station not far 
from the shop with a cut on his forehead. 
The State's next witness was L. A. Jacobson, also 
an officer of the Ogden City Police Department. Mr. 
Jacobson testified that upon hearing the radioed call 
for help from Officers Muller and Birch he and his part-
ner proceeded to the location given in the call (R. 58). 
When they reached the store, they pulled their patrol 
car into an alley at the rear of the store and it was then 
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that Officer Jacobson first noticed the broken window 
(R. 58). After starting to search for the appellant after 
his attempt to escape, Jacobson returned to the ~tore 
after the appellant had been found and examined the 
rear of the building with a spotlight (R. 59). Shortly 
thereafter he heard a noise from inside the building and 
heard the man who was in the building apparently run-
ning towards the front. Officer Jacobson ran around 
the building and arrived in front of the shop just as he 
dropped to the floor behind a showcase. Officer Jacob-
son then talked with the appellant and asked him ''That 
he had been doing in the vicinity of the store. The ap-
pellant said he was just on his way home (R. 60). 
After the store owner's son had arrived and had 
opened the front door, Officer Jacobson entered the 
store and there confronted Charles Brooks, placing 
him under arrest. At that time Brooks said, "Well, I 
guess you got me cold turkey" (R. 60). Officer Jacob-
eson further testified that before appellant was taken 
to the police station he, in a conversation with Officer 
Jacobson, stated that, "I didn't go inside of the place 
Jake, I will swear to that' ' ( R 64). After Officers Birch 
and Muller had left for the police station with the 
appellant and Brooks, Officer Jacobson returned to the 
rear of the building and discovered some tools and a 
ladder which had been hidden by covering it with card-
board (R. 61). In his examination of the building and 
the area immediately surrounding it he found a plank 
whieh was about 8 to 10 feet in length. It was lying at the 
rear of the building (R. 68). It caught his attention and 
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he checked it to see if with its use a person could have 
reached the window which was about 18 feet above the 
ground (R. 69). He testified that it was short and reached 
only a little more than half-way up the building (R. 69). 
Officer Jacobson also testified to the fact that he had 
seen both the appellant and Brooks earlier in the eve-
ning in each other's company (R. 77). 
The State's next witness was Mr. Glen Robbins. He 
testified that during the early morning hours of July 3, 
1955, he was aroused by the ringing of the telephone 
and when he answered he was informed that his father's 
store had been burglarized and was asked to come and 
open up the store (R. 79). He was present when Officer 
Jacobson confronted Brooks and when Brooks said 
"something about you got me cold turkey" (R. 80). Mr. 
Robbins made a quick tour through the store to see if 
anything had been stolen. He also examined the cash 
register. Mr. Robbins testified that the ladder did not 
belong to the store and to his knowledge had not been 
on the premises before (R. 81). With this the State closed 
its case. 
The defense called as its first witness the appellant, 
Eugene Johnson, who was sworn and testified as fol-
lows: That during the afternoon of July 2, 1955, he 
met Charles Brooks in downtown Ogden. They soon start-
ed drinking and continued to do so through the after-
noon and evening (R. 22). It was his testimony that 
during this time they both consumed quite a bit of wine 
(R. 89). Late in the evening Brooks decided that he 
wanted to go to the Dee Hospital to visit his mother. 
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Appellant accompanied Brooks to the hospital and 
waited outside (R. 89). After Brooks came out of the 
hospital he talked to appellant and told him that his 
sister lived not far from there and that he wished to go 
see her (R. 89). Appellant claims by this time to have de-
veloped a bad cough and became ill, due to the amount of 
wine consumed. After they arrived at Brooks' sister's 
home they decided not to disturb the family, the house 
being dark. At that time appellant mentioned to Brooks 
that he wished to lie down because he was sick (R. 90). 
They then walked behind some buildings looking for a 
place where appellant could rest; they found a small fire 
burning in a field and sat down beside it. Appellant 
claims that as soon as he had stretched out on the ground 
he fell asleep (R. 90). It is his story that he does not 
know how long he was asleep and that when he awoke 
Brooks was gone. Upon awakening he got up and walked 
to the front of the building to see if there was a clock 
inside. He did not see one and as he turned to leave he 
was stopped by the policemen. The appellant claims 
that after he had been handcuffed and placed in the 
police car he felt very ill and nauseated. He maintains 
that he did not try to escape but only left the car so that 
he would not dirty it if he came sick to his stomach again 
(R. 92). However, he does not explain why he ran away 
from the rar in such a hurry that he stumbled and fell. 
Appellant claims that he did not cooperate with 
Brooks in planning the burglary of the store; that he did 
not know that Brooks intended to burglarize the store 
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and that he was in no way implicated in the burglary. 
Under cross-examination appellant admitted that he had 
a previous criminal record and that he had been con-
victed of a felony (R. 96). 
The final witness called by the defense was Charles 
Brooks, who testified substantially as did the appellant. 
It is his story that he obtained entrance into the building 
by climbing up the plank that was found by Officer J a-
cobson (R. 105). Yet he claims to have done this while 
drunk. Brooks claims to have found the plank leaning up 
against the building and noticed that it almost reached 
the window (R. 105). He makes the claim that it was 
only curiosity that prompted him to climb up this plank 
and enter the building. Once inside the building, Brooks 
claims to have become so ill that he felt it necessary to 
lie down and did so after he discovered that the plank 
had apparently been knocked over. The flashlight that 
was found in his possession he claims to have discovered 
at the foot of the plank just before he started to climb up 
it (R. 106). Brooks claims to have had no criminal intent 
in entering the building; that his reason for entering was 
unknown to him because of his drunken condition. He 
claims never to have seen the ladder which was presented 
as the State's Exhibit D during the trial (R. 112). He also 
testified to the fact that he and the appellant never dis-
cussed burglarizing the store; (R. 108) never planned to 
burglarize the store, nor did in fact cooperate in the 
burglary (R. 109). Brooks, claiming that at the time he 
gained entrance to the store, appellant was still asleep by 
the fire (R. 105-106). Brooks also admits that he has a 
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criminal record having been convicted of a felony pre-
viously (R. 112). With this the defense rested. 
The matter was then submitted to the jury which 
found appellant and Brooks guilty of burglary in the 
second degree. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS 
DISCRETION WHEN IT REFUSED TO 
GRANT APPELLANT'S MOTION TO DIS-
MISS THE INFORMATION BECAUSE WHEN 
SUCH A MOTION IS MADE THE JUDGE 
l\1UST ASSUME THE TRUTH OF THE 
STATE'S EVIDENCE AND GIVE TO THE 
STATE THE BENEFIT OF ALL THE LEGIT-




THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS 
DISCRETION WHEN IT REFUSED TO 
GRANT APPELLANT'S MOTION TO DIS-
MISS THE INFORMATION BECAUSE WHEN 
SUCH A :MOTION IS MADE THE JUDGE 
MUST ASSUl\1E THE TRUTH OF THE 
STATE'S EVIDENCE AND GIVE TO THE 
STATE THE BENEFIT OF ALL THE LEGIT-
IMATE INFERENCES TO BE DRA \VN 
THEREFROM. 
Section 77-31-31, Utah Code Annotated 1953, pro-
vides in part as follows, concerning the responsibility 
of a jury at a criminal trial. "On a trial * * * questions 
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of law are to be decided by the court and questions the 
fact by the jury * * *. '' The early case of People v. 
Biddlecome, 3 Utah 208; 2 P. 194, established the law in 
Utah wherein it was held that the jurors are the sole 
judges of the facts. Also in the case of State v. Bayes, 
47 Utah 474 155 P. 335, the court stated that it was the 
exclusive province of the jury to judge the credibility 
of witnesses. In making the motion to dismiss the infor-
mation, counsel for appellant claims that the State had 
not '' * * * established a prima facie case * * * '' nor had 
the State produced any evidence showing criminal intent 
on the part of Brooks or appellant. The evidence pre-
sented by the State has been summarized in the State-
ment of Facts. What did it show~ It placed before the 
jury the following facts to be considered: 
1. How did Brooks get into the store~ 
(A) Is it plausible to believe a drunk man could 
climb up a 2x10 plank leaning against a build-
ing, and though it was only 10 feet long, be able to 
climb up to and through a window which was ap-
proximately 18 feet above the ground. 
(B) Or is it more believable that the ladder, dis-
covered at the rear of the building, had been used 
by Brooks to climb through the window and that 
after he had entered the store, that it had been 
removed and hidden so as not to attract attention. 
2. Was appellant so intoxicated that he had no 
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(A) Is it plausible to believe that appellant was 
so intoxicated that he did not see Brooks inside 
the building when he was in front of the store and 
he did not know that Brooks had entered the 
building? 
(B) Or is it more believable to assume that appel-
ant was participating in the burglary to the ex-
tent that he was acting as a look-out and had 
removed the ladder after Brooks had entered 
the store¥ 
3. Had appellant after he had been handcuffed and 
placed in the police car under arrest, gotten out of the 
car only to keep from getting it dirty? 
(A) Is it possible to believe that appellant was 
only interested in not dirtying the police car? 
(B) Or is it more plausible to believe that appel-
lant was trying to escape when he discovered the 
police had left him unguarded? 
In the light of the foregoing, it would appear that 
counsel's objection was directed at the weight of the 
evidence and not at its sufficiency. Though most of the 
evidence introduced by the State was circumstantial, it 
was consistent with the hypothesis of guilt when com-
pared with facts that are proven. State v. Crawford, 59 
Utah 39; 201 P. 1030. The evidence was such that it 
effectively excluded the other theory presented by the 
defense, i. e. that appellant and Brooks were so intoxi-
cated they did not know what they were doing. State r. 
rVells, 35 Utah 400, State 1-. Crawford supra. In the case 
10 
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of State v. Penderville, 2 Utah 2d 281; 272 P. 2d 195, this 
honorable court commented as follows upon the duty 
of the trial court when considering a motion to dismiss 
or a motion for a directed verdict because of the lack of 
evidence: 
"It has been repeatedly held by this court 
that upon a motion to dismiss or to direct a verdict 
of not guilty for lack of evidence that the trial 
court does not consider the weight of the evidence 
or credibility of the witnesses, but determines the 
naked legal proposition of law, whether there is 
any substantial evidence of the guilt of the ac-
cused, and all reasonable inferences are to be taken 
in favor of the state. State v. Lewellyn, 71 Utah 
331, 266 P. 261; State v. Thatcher, 108 Utah 63, 
167 P. 2d 258; State v. Aures, 102 Utah 113, 127 P. 
2d 872; State v. Peterson, 121 Utah 229, 240 P. 2d 
504. As is pointed out in one or more of these 
cases, the trial court has a discretion in the case of 
a motion for a new trial that it does not have in 
case of a motion to dismiss or to direct a verdict of 
not guilty. Nevertheless, in either case if there is 
before the court evidence upon which reasonable 
men might differ as to whether the defendant is or 
is not guilty, he may deny the motion." (Emphasis 
added.) 
From the evidence presented at the trial one may 
reasonably infer that the appellant was cooperating with 
Brooks in the burglary; that appellant assisted Brooks by 
helping him to enter the store and that appellant 
was attempting to escape when he found he was left 
unguarded in the police car. The fact that the appel-
lant and Brooks had been together throughout the 
evening hours of July 2, 1955, and were still within 
close proximity of each other during the burglary, would 
11 
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also allow the jury to draw an inference that there had 
been cooperation and planning by the two prior to the 
entry of the store by Brooks. The California Supreme 
Court in the case of People v. Adams, 119 Cal. App. 2d 
445, 259 P. 2d 56 commented as follows : 
''If the evidence against the appellant, con-
sidered by itself without regard to conflicting evi-
dence, tends to support the verdict, the question 
ceases to be one of law, of which this court alone 
has jurisdiction, and becomes one of fact upon 
which the decision of the trial court or jury is final 
and conclusive. * * * Questions as to the weight 
of the evidence and the credibility of the witnesses 
are for the trier of fact, and it may believe and 
accept a portion of the testimony of a witness and 
disbelieve the remainder. * "' * People v. Hender-
son, 34 Cal. 2d 340, 346; 209 P. 2d 785. People v. 
Thomas, 103 Cal. App. 2d 669, * * *'' 
Another California case, People v. Huizenga, 34 
Calif. 2d 669 213 P. 2d 710 quotes very extensively from 
the federal case, Curley v. United States, 81 U. S. App. 
D. C. 389 160 F. 2d 229. In the Curley case the court thor-
oughly examined the history of the rule of law that re-
quires the judge to submit to the jury the question of 
the credibility of the witness and the weight of the 
evidence. 
" '* * * This contention confuses the function 
of court and jury by implying that if the court 
itself can formulate a reasonable theory of inno-
cence from the evidence it must reverse a judg-
ment of. conviction. It is not for the court, how-
ever, to determine whether it can formulate such 
a theorv. It must assume in favor of the verdict 
the exi~tence of every fact that the jury could rea-
sonably deduce from the evidence and then deter-
12 
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mine whether or not a reasonable jury could find 
the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. 
* * * Thus, the rule that the circumstances relied 
upon by the prosecution must be consistent with 
guilt and inconsistent with an hypothesis of inno-
cence is a rule of instruction for the jury, and is 
not the rule for the guidance of the court on re-
view. People v. Newland, supra, 15 Cal. 2d [678], 
at page 682,104 P. 2d [778], at page 780. 
'' 'The functions of the jury include the deter-
mination of the credibility of witnesses, the 
weighing of the evidence, and the drawing of jus-
tifiable inferences of fact from proven facts. It 
is the function of the judge to deny the jury any 
opportunity to operate beyond its province. The 
jury may not be permitted to conjecture merely, 
or to conclude upon pure speculation or from pas-
sion, prejudice or sympathy. The critical point in 
this boundary is the existence or non-existence of 
a reasonable doubt as to guilt. If the evidence is 
such that reasonable jurymen must necessarily 
have such a doubt, the judge must require acquit-
tal, because no other result is permissible within 
the fixed bounds of jury consideration. But if a 
reasonable mind might fairly have a reasonable 
doubt or might fairly not have one, the case is for 
the jury, and the decision is for the jurors to make. 
The law recognizes that the scope of a reasonable 
mind is broad. Its conclusion is not always a point 
certain, but, upon given evidence, may be one of 
a number of conclusions. Both innocence and guilt 
beyond reasonable doubt may lie fairly within the 
limits of reasonable conclusion from given facts. 
The judge's function is exhausted when he deter-
mines that the evidence does or does not permit 
the conclusion of guilt beyond reasonable doubt 
within the fair operation of a reasonable mind.' 
Curley v. United States, 81 U. S. App. D. C. 389, 
160 F. 2d 229, 232." (Emphasis added.) 
13 
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Section 76-1-44 Utah Code Annotated 1953 provides 
in part as follows: 
''All persons concerned in the commission of 
a crime, either felony or misdemeanor, whether 
they directly commit the act constituting the of-
fense or aid and abet in its commission * * * or, 
* * * have advised and encouraged its commis-
sion, * * * are principals in the crime so com-
mitted.'' 
One is an ''aider'' and ''a better'' in the commission 
of any crime if he is an active partner in the intent 
which was the crime's basic element and the least de-
gree of concert or collusion between parties to an illegal 
transaction makes acts of one the acts of all. Cammon-
wealth v. Lowry, 89 Atl. 2d 733, 374 Penn. 594; Dye v. 
State, 40 S. 2d 641, 34 Ala. App. 371; State v. Lord, 84 P. 
2d 80, 42 New Mexico 638. Under this definition a per-
son to be found an aider or abetter must have partici-
pated in some way in the commission of a crime. The 
participation need only be enouragement. 
Therefore, the respondent feels that the judge in 
refusing appellant's motion to dismiss the information 
did not violate the discretion vested in him, and, in fact, 
was obligated to allow the matter to go to the jury. 
CONCLUSION 
The verdict of the lower court should be sustained. 
Respectfully submitted 
E. R. CALLISTER 
Attorney General 
MAURICE D. JONES 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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